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INTRODUCTION THIS PAPER DESCRIBES an extension of the standard additive utility specification in which the utility at time t for a consumption process c is defined by (1) Vt E [ e-p6(S-t)u(cs) ds] t >O~
where Et denotes expectation given information available at time t. The more general utility functions, called recursive, exhibit intertemporal consistency and admit Bellman's characterization of optimality. Much of the tractability of (1) is therefore preserved. For example, a companion paper shows that the recursive utility specification implies a model of asset pricing that incorporates Breeden's (1979) consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) as a special case. A special example of the utility model presented in this paper is obtained by making the assumption that information at time t is that generated by Brownian motion. In this case, after a simplifying change of variables, the utility process V for a consumption process c is determined by an "aggregator',' function f and is cA is high for all t and T. In contrast, consumption levels in nonoverlapping intervals are serially independent in cB. Diversification motives suggest that cB may be strictly preferred to cA, although the psychic cost of serially fluctuating consumption would work in the opposite direction. The essential difference between cB and cC is that, in the former, all uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, while in CC uncertainty is resolved gradually on [1, T]. Indifference between cB and cC is thus not compelling and arguments, based on the psychic costs and benefits of early resolution, can be proposed for either preference direction. (See Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Chew and Epstein (1990) for details in a discrete-time setting. We have nothing to add in this paper with regard to attitudes towards the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.)
We proceed as follows: Section 2 provides a definition of recursive utility in continuous time. A "morally equivalent" but mathematically more workable definition is presented in Section 3, along with a proof of existence. Section 4 contains some examples and observations regarding the potential usefulness for continuous-time modeling of generalizations of expected utility that have been proposed recently (for example, Machina (1982) ). Sufficient conditions for several desirable properties of recursive utility are established in Section 5. In Section 6, an extension of the usual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is shown to characterize optimality. Section 7 includes some extensions. Readers interested mainly in the asset pricing implications of stochastic differential utility could begin directly with Duffie and Epstein (1991).
RECURSIVE UTILITY IN CONTINUOUS TIME
This section defines recursive utility in a continuous-time stochastic setting that will be the basis for the remainder of the paper. In order to overcome this inflexibility of the (recursive) intertemporal expected utility model, Epstein and Zin (1989) propose the general recursive structure (4), with the following interpretation: From the perspective of time t, the intertemporal utility Vt+1 for period t + 1 and beyond is a random variable.
Thus the agent first computes the certainty equivalent m( -Vt+ I Yt) of the conditional distribution -Vt+i Yt of Vt+ 1 given information Ft at time t, and then combines the latter with ct via the aggregator W. This functional structure has two components: the aggregator W, which encodes the intertemporal substitutability of consumption; and the certainty equivalent function m, which encodes risk aversion in the sense described in Epstein and Zin (1989) and also below. In a finite-horizon setting, Kreps and Porteus (1978) study (4) under the assumption that m is an expected-utility-based certainty equivalent such as (8) below.
Here, we develop the continuous-time formulation of Epstein and Zin's class of recursive utility. A parallel exercise for the deterministic case was undertaken in Epstein (1987) , in which the continuous-time version of Koopmans' class of preferences is formulated. The key observation in the latter paper is that, for a given program, (2) could be viewed as a difference equation in the utility levels Vt. This observation led naturally to the differential equation (5). Similar intuition applies under uncertainty if we begin with (4). At time t, Vt is known with certainty and thus m( VtI t) = Vt. Relation (4) therefore defines a difference equation in the certainty equivalent utility. The continuous-time analogue, we argue in this paper, is the stochastic differential representation (7), at least in the case of information generated by Brownian motion.
In the remainder of this section we give a definition of continuous-time recursive utility that, in the following section, will be used to justify the stochastic differential expression (7) for utility. We also introduce some notation and terminology to be used later on.
The primitives for uncertainty in our model are: . a time set S7= [0, T], for some finite T, . a probability space (UI, , P), and . a filtration F = {,F: t E $} of sub-cr-algebras of F satisfying the usual conditions (right-continuous, increasing, and augmented).
For notational simplicity alone, we suppose throughout that 0 is trivial, in that it contains only events for probability zero or 1. For technical definitions, we refer the reader throughout to Protter (1990) or Chung and Williams (1990) . An Appendix co-authored with Costis Skiadas treats the infinite time horizon case.
Consumption processes are valued in a closed convex subset e of some separable Banach lattice, which, for concreteness, the reader can think of as R', for 1 commodities. We use llcll to denote the norm of a consumption choice c E X?. The space D of consumption processes is then taken to be the optional2 e-valued square-integrable processes. (As usual, we equate any two consumption processes that are equal almost everywhere.) The optional restriction implies basically that the consumption rate ct can depend only on the information available at time t. The square-integrability restriction means that any c in D has finite norm ICIID = [E(f jTllCtl2 dt )]1/2.
The utility process for a given consumption process c E D is defined by a semimartingale3 V; for any time t, the random variable Vt is treated as the utility for the "continuation" {cs: s > t} given $t, as with (1). Of course, V0 is the utility of the entire process c.
For any interval X of the real line, let 3(X) denote the space of probability measures on X whose mean exists. By a certainty equivalent m, we mean a function m: R(X) -* DR that assigns to a probability measure p (representing the distribution of utility) its certainty equivalent m(p), satisfying: One example of such a function-others are provided below-is the expected-utility based specification
, where V is a real-valued integrable random variable, V denotes its distribution, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern index h is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisfies a growth condition.5 Risk aversion for m does not necessarily correspond to risk aversion of intertemporal utility, and thus the former will not generally be assumed for a certainty equivalent. Occasionally, however, we will adopt the following assumption.
2A e-valued process c is optional if c: n x 5-S e is measurable with respect to the c--algebra on n x Y generated by the space of right-continuous with left limits (cadlag) F-adapted processes, and the Borel c--algebra on e.
3A semimartingale is an adapted process that can be written in the form H + Y, with Y a local martingale and H a finite variation process.
4A distribution p' exhibits first order stochastic dominance over a distribution p, by definition, if the cumulative distribution function of p' is dominated by the cumulative distribution function of p.
5That is, for some constant k, h(x) < k(t + Ix 1), implying integrability of h(V).
ASSUMPTION 2: For all p E 9(X), m(p) < mG5p), where fx = fx dp(x) is the mean of p.
For purposes of motivating our formulation of recursive utility in continuoustime, we will suppose that V is the utility process for a consumption process c. In a discrete-time setting, with sufficient regularity on W, we can apply the implicit function theorem to (4) in order to obtain a representation of the form: 
reduces to (5) when c is deterministic. Thus, f determines the degree of intertemporal substitution of consumption and other aspects of "certainty preferences." Of course, just as with the additive special case, f also generates collateral risk attitudes under uncertainty. Given f, however, risk attitudes are finally fixed by the certainty equivalent m, which has no effect on intertemporal substitution. Some degree of separation is therefore achieved. Our next step is to derive an essentially equivalent definition of the utility process based on smoothness assumptions on the certainty equivalent m, show conditions for existence, and finally derive a number of properties of this utility function. The reverse direction of providing an axiomatic derivation of (12) is not pursued here. Our analysis therefore parallels Lucas and Stokey (1984) , which begins with W and (2) and examines the implied utility functions, rather than Koopmans (1960), which axiomatizes (2). In the discrete-time case with uncertainty, Epstein and Zin (1989) begin with the functional structure (4), while Chew and Epstein (1990) provide an axiomatic basis. A different axiomatic approach is given by Skiadas (1991).
A STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL MODEL OF RECURSIVE UTILITY
In order to derive a stochastic differential model of utility based in spirit on the recursive definition (12), we adopt smoothness assumptions on the certainty equivalent function m. Our objective is to reach via informal arguments the model of utility defined by (18) and subsequently by (25).
Smoothness Assumptions
Consider the following smoothness hypothesis which is related to Machina's (1982) local expected utility hypothesis described in Example 4 of Section 4. The Gateaux derivative of a certainty equivalent m at a measure v in the direction of a measure p, when it exists, is defined by Then 7r'(O) # 0, implying that for small gambles about x* the risk premium is proportional to the standard deviation of the gamble. Segal and Spivak (1990) refer to this property (for all, not only expected, utility functions) as 'first-order' local risk aversion (or risk loving if 7r' < 0), in order to contrast it with the more customary 'second-order' local risk aversion, for which the premium is proportional to the variance. We do not have a characterization of certainty equivalents that are smooth at certainty, but can refer to Allen (1987) for a characterization of smooth certainty equivalents. The examples in Section 4, however, show that this assumption is not overly restrictive and they suggest the conjecture that the essential property of preferences that is excluded by smoothness at certainty is "first-order" risk aversion. Section 7.3 sketches an example characterizing utility without a smooth certainty equivalent in terms of "local time" risk aversion. See Epstein and Zin (1990) and (1991) for some implications of "first-order" risk aversion for asset pricing. 
The Brownian Case
For now, we will restrict ourselves to the standard filtration F = {Y[} of a standard Brownian motion B in Rfd, for some dimension d E N. That is, F is the oa-algebra generated by the null sets of F and {Bs: 0 < s < t}. Based on this assumption of "Brownian information," we can deduce the form of the utility process V corresponding to a given consumption process c in D. At the end of the paper, we make some remarks concerning extensions to more general information.
With Brownian information given an aggregator (f, m) with certainty equivalent m that is smooth at certainty, it is natural to conjecture that a utility process V is an Ito process. That is, we conjecture that V has a stochastic differential representation of the form dVt = ,Ut dt +otdBt, where ,u and a-are progressively measurable processes valued in lR and Rd, -respectively. At any time t, under strong technical conditions (that we avoid here since we have no need to rigorously justify the following calculation) we Technical conditions under which (18) and (12) could easily be proven equivalent would be much stronger and clumsier than those that we will ultimately use to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution V to (18). For our purposes, the following "morally equivalent" definition of the utility process is therefore proposed. We extend the ordinal equivalence relation on aggregators by defining (f, m) and (f, mn) to be ordinally equivalent if they generate ordinally equivalent utility functions, or (in case the existence of utility functions is unresolved) if there is a C2 change of variables p satisfying (21). In what follows, we will identify ordinally equivalent aggregators.
At this point, it is evident why the risk-aversion Assumption 2 was not maintained for certainty equivalents-it is not preserved by the ordinal equivalence relation and hence is not a statement about the underlying intertemporal preference ordering. However, as mentioned near the end of Section 2, an assumption such as risk aversion for m is meaningful for intertemporal preferences if f is fixed. See, for example, Propositions 6 and 7 below and the discussion preceding the latter.
Even for fixed f, distinct certainty equivalents m and mn can generate ordinally equivalent aggregators (f,m) and (f,mn). Given our specialization here to Brownian information, the drift function ,-t depends on m only via its variance multiplier A. Thjis, we are justified in referring to (f, m) and (f, mth), or m and m as being observationally equivalent with Brownian information if their respective variance multipliers A and A are identical functions. In that case, an individual's choices between consumption processes would be identical given m or m?i. Some comments on the implications for "observability" with more general information structures are offered in Section 4.
Normalization of Stochastic Differential Utility
In this subsection we pursue conditions under which, for each consumption process c, there is a unique solution V to the defining equation (18).
In order to reduce the existence issue to a standard fixed point problem, our first step is to design a change of variables 'p that eliminates the variance multiplier A from the formulation. That is, we consider the possibility of choosing a 'p so that the new variance multiplier A defined by (22) 
EXAMPLES
We offer several examples of aggregators and, in some cases, the corresponding stochastic differential utility function. A closed-form expression for the utility function is not generally available.
In order to clarify the examples and differences among them, we describe how they rank the three consumption programs described in the introduction. One can verify that, apart from the special cases of Examples 2 and 3 which coincide with (1), we have: The certainty equivalents considered so far are all consistent with expected utility theory. A number of generalizations of the expected utility model have been proposed recently as rationalizations of behavior such as that exhibited in the Allais paradox. In the final two examples, we integrate two of these generalizations into our model in order to examine their implications for choice in a continuous-time setting. The new theories all deal with static or one-shot choice environments, and specify utility or evaluation functionals for probability distributions on the real line. These functionals enter our model as alternative certainty-equivalent components of an aggregator.
It will be convenient to consider real-valued consumption processes (v= R+) over an infinite time horizon, considered in Appendix C, and also to adopt a change of variables for which the constant path at level c has utility c. It follows that the utility of any consumption process c is equal to c if the constant consumption path at level c is indifferent to c. In other words, utility is measured in consumption units. This normalization of utility corresponds to the condition (29) f(c,c)=O, ceDR+.
Of course, (18) defines the manner in which m affects intertemporal utility. Preference or behavioral interpretations of m are more explicit, however, if we temporarily extend beyond the case of Brownian information used in most of our analysis. Such an extension is also useful in understanding the discussion (in the following examples) of the extent to which different certainty equivalents are observationally equivalent. Consider consumption processes for which consumption is constant at co on [0, r) and such that, at time i, consumption jumps to a new random level c that persists thereafter. Both X and the probability distribution c are known at t = 0, and no further information regarding the latter is obtained during (0, r). Suppose, further, that utility is measured in consumption units and is generated by an aggregator (f, m) satisfying (29). Then, by a natural extension of our analysis, for given X and co, the utility of the process described above is an increasing function of m( -). Thus m defines the preference ranking between suitable pairs of consumption processes. The intuition for this finding is clear: Given recursivity, the choice between two consumption processes is determined, via "integration," by the certainty equivalent assigned at each t to the uncertainty to be faced over a "small" interval [t, t + ]. At t, VK is known with certainty, while the uncertainty represented by VK+8 is "small" given Brownian information. Thus, the only properties of mQ ) that are relevant are those that are reflected in evaluating small risks about certainty. Machina's local analysis and propositions extend expected utility analysis and results in a substantive way precisely because it is assumed that the relevant domain includes small gambles about arbitrary initial probability distributions. (Mathematically, therefore, one can identify the entire Frechet derivative rather than just the local gradient representation M.) Even if jumps in utility are allowed, as when a Poisson component is present, the uncertainty faced at any instant still represents a small risk about certainty. Though a discrete jump is possible, the size of the jump is deterministic and the conditional probability that one will occur in [t, t + E] is small (roughly 1 In the case of Brownian information, it follows as in the preceding example that betweenness and expected utility certainty equivalents are empirically indistinguishable from one another. But a caveat must be applied to this assertion since the above differentiability assumptions for H(, y) rule out some economically interesting betweenness functionals, called semi-weighted utility by Chew (1989) . Such utility functions exhibit 'first-order' local risk aversion, as explained in Section 3. First-order local risk aversion is also a generic property of rank-dependent utility theory, which is an alternative axiomatic generalization of expected utility due to Quiggin (1982) Q.E.D. Q.E.D.
Time Consistency

An important property of recursive utility functions is that they exhibit intertemporal consistency. Consider the following axiom on a family > = { >o,t: (G, t) E 12 x [0, T]} of binary orders on D. We let c at j denote
Comparative Risk Aversion
In order to justify our claim that the generalization from additively separable expected utility to recursive utility makes possible a degree of separation between intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, we need the following definition: DEFINITION-(Comparative Risk Aversion): Let U* and U be two stochastic differential utility functions. We say that U* is more risk averse than U if U* rejects any gamble that is rejected by U, that is, for any c E D and any deterministic process c in D,
U(c) < U(c) =>U*(c) < U*(c)'.
If U* and U are comparable according to this definition, then they must rank deterministic programs identically. After a change of variables, they must be identical on the set of deterministic consumption processes, from which it follows that they share the same function f as the first component of their aggregators. Thus the following theorem restricts attention to the case f* = f. The reader will note from the proof that A* AA is also close to a necessary condition for U* to be more risk averse than U. 
Lemma B2 then implies that U(c) > U*(c), and the result follows. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 6, we can increase the degree of risk aversion of the intertemporal preference ordering without affecting "certainty preferences" by keeping the f-component of the aggregator unchanged and changing the certainty equivalent so that the variance multiplier falls. A sufficient condition for A* < A is that m*() < m(); that is, m* is smaller and hence the more risk averse certainty equivalent. This can be proved by applying Ito's Lemma to a judiciously chosen consumption process, and extending the argument used to
prove (15). If m(-V) =h-'(E[h(V)]) and m*(& V) =h*-(E[h*(V)])
, then m* < m if and only if h* is more concave than h on the range of the utility process.
Risk Aversion
We may not only want to compare the degrees of risk aversion of two recursive utility functions, but also to determine whether a given utility function is risk averse in an absolute sense. For any consumption process c, let E(c) denote the deterministic process defined, almost everywhere, by E(c)t = E(ct). The stochastic Gronwall-Bellman inequality was the basis for most of the proofs in the first draft of the paper. Costis Skiadas then provided the authors with the following consequence of Gronwall's inequality, which has allowed us to simplify the structure of most of the proofs in Section 5.
LEMMA B2: Let (Q, Y1, F, P) be a filtered probability space whose filtration F = {E,: t e [0, T]} satisfies the usual conditions. Suppose {Xs} and {Ys} are integrable optional processes, a is a constant, and {Gs} is a measurable process. 
APPENDIX C: THE INFINITE HORIZON CASE WITH COSTIS SKIADAS
This appendix9 addresses the definition, existence, and properties of an infinite horizon stochastic differential utility function. The issue of existence is analogous to that of stability of a nonlinear feedback system. Stability is guaranteed by imposing a "uniform sector condition" on the "feedback function." The basic properties of the finite horizon recursive utility presented in the body of the paper generalize directly to the infinite horizon case. For the finite time horizon T, given a consumption process c, and under regularity conditions on f, the main body of the paper shows the existence of a unique integrable semimartingale, VT, the recursive utility process corresponding to 9A version of this appendix appeared originally as a short paper by Duffie, Epstein, and Skiadas. 
Assumptions
The issue of existence of the infinite horizon recursive utility has the flavor of that of stability of nonlinear feedback systems. We can view f as a nonlinear feedback function. In control theory literature, f is often required to satisfy a "sector condition." (See for example Vidyasagar (1978) .) Here we will employ a more stringent "uniform sector condition," which can also be viewed as a generalized Lipschitz condition.
In the sequel f: ex Rl -* R will be taken to be a measurable function satisfying the following regularity conditions: 
Q.E.D.
1l Recall that an optional process is necessarily progressively measurable.
